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Brother, Can You Paradigm? Or Generating a Paradigm
of Information for MIS
Timothy G. Babbitt
The Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
This paper presents an argument for the development of a paradigm of information for MIS. A review of work
already established in other disciplines is given, and a discussion of the overall problems of information
theory development is presented.

Introduction
In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that the field of MIS is lacking a consistent lens by which to study
“information” and “knowledge” (Babbitt 1997). Recent research for example, on organizational knowledge (Kogut and Zander
1992 ; Grant 1996 ; Grant 1996 ; Nonaka 1994), and organizational learning (Huber 1991 ; Brown and Duguid 1991 ; Attewell
1992) have required such concepts, and authors have generally given limited discussion to address them.
The need for such concept development in MIS stems from Kuhn’s proposal for a philosophy of science in which the
activities of a mature discipline are based upon a “paradigm” or way of looking at the field which is common to all (or most)
of the practitioners of the science (Kuhn 1962). Without such a paradigm, an effective, or mature, discipline cannot exist. “The
search for a paradigm is pointless, however, unless three fundamental conditions hold. First, the members of the discipline must
perceive some set of objects where they have a comparative advantage, relative to other disciplines, in developing a paradigm.
Second, they must perceive that the set of objects exhibits behavior about which they can theorize. Third, order must underlie
the behavior of the objects that members of the discipline choose to investigate. Without order, theories and paradigms cannot
exist, for the primary purpose of paradigms is to articulate a perceived order underlying the phenomena of interest” (Weber
1987).
The main aim of this study is therefore to review the results of proposed information theories and articulate some potential
problems with information theories in a general context. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is hoped that with a careful
effort within the ranks of MIS, we can generate a paradigm of information.
Most of the information concepts to be reviewed will be from contributions devoted to this question, rather than from
contributions, which attack some other problem yet require, or imply, an information/knowledge concept.

Survey of Extant Theory
Not everybody understands the same thing by information. In modern information theory a distinction is made between
structural-attributive and functional-cybernetic types of theories. While representatives of the former approach conceive
information as structure, variety, order, and so on, members of the latter understand information as functionality, functional
meaning or as a property of organized systems. The following is a brief review of the dominant theories associated with
information theory.

Functional-Cybernetic View of Information
Theory of Selective Information
Shannon and Weaver are almost the only formalized, mathematical and successfully implemented information concept ever
proposed for any purpose. Concerned with
“The fundamental problem of communication [which] is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or
approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning…These semantic
aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual
message is one selected from a set of possible messages.” (Shannon and Weaver 1969)
Thus Shannon’s information measure refers not to the message itself in terms of its contents, but rather to the probabilities
assigned by the potential recipient to the set of all possible messages, the least probable message having the highest information
value. There have been extensions to Shannon (Artandi 1973 ; Belzer 1973), but are not widely used.
General Information Phenomenon
Otten develops a general model where information is a system specific interpretation of external stimuli; that is, an internal
state-change in the system which may or may not be externally observable (Otten 1975). System-specificity allows different
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ideas of information to exist at the different levels, which are unified by the general concept and by the interdependence of the
levels. Information in this concept is the state-change.
Information as Event
Pratt develops that information be considered as an event that takes place at a particular state in the communication process
(Pratt 1977). The model involves two separate systems: one of source, purpose, language, and medium, resulting in a graphic
record; the other of recipient, predisposition, and knowledge of or preference for language and medium. The means to
communication between source and recipient is through matching of predisposition with purpose and recipient language and
medium with source language and medium. “Information is the alteration of the image [knowledge] which occurs when it
receives a message” (Pratt 1977). He believes that the key event is “that-which-occurs-within-the-mind-upon-absorption-of-amessage”, and contends that information is the appropriate term for this event (Pratt 1977).

Structural-attributive View of Information
Information as Knowledge Surrogate
Farradane proposes that information must be considered as a representation or surrogate of (internal) knowledge or thought
(Farradane 1976). This is based on his view of information science which
“must…certainly include some study of human beings, and in particular their processes of thinking and their
behavior in all actions relating to communication, whether they are the originators, the manipulators, or the
recipients of communication.” (Farradane 1976)
By analyzing the communication system thus defined, and the processes which take place in it, Farradane notes that the only
externally available element is the physical object which is a representation of what is meant to be communicated, and that, he
says, is information. This may be too constricting, as it does not consider the effect of information on the recipient. In many
ways, this is perhaps consistent with the viewpoint taken in the literature on organizational learning and the knowledge-based
firm.
Information as Structure
Thompson proposes that information be considered as organization, in particular organization of sense-data and experience,
but also as organization on various conglomerates (Thompson 1968). The basic point is that the structuring of what we
experience is the informative event, but that information can be considered as the resulting structure, or organization, rather than
the event itself. The effect of information can then be considered as change in the organization of the recipient.
MacKay develops his so-called descriptive information theory, in which knowledge must be understood as a coherent
representation in which the information element comes to be embedded (MacKay 1969). This information element can therefore
not be understood as a shapeless isolated thing, but has to have a minimum of structure so that the meaning of the information
intended by the sender can be inferred by the receiver.
Belkin and Robertson also develop an explicitly structural concept of information based on the notion that “information is
that which is capable of transforming structure” (Belkin and Robertson 1976). From a communication standpoint, it assumes
that the sender has knowledge of the recipients’ structure.
Information as Subjective Construct
Dervin & Nilan propose a shift from traditional view of information as “thing” seek to measure the system of information,
toward a “cognitive approach” (Belkin 1990). The viewpoint is that “information is a subjective phenomenon, constructed at
least to some extent by the user, and not an objective phenomenon” (Dervin and Nilan 1986). Additionally, they posit
information “as something constructed by human beings.”
Cole uses Dervin and Nilan’s view of information as a subjective construct (Dervin and Nilan 1986) and applies it to
Minsky’s theory of frames (Minsky 1975), and conclude that it does not apply to lower level processing (word/object
recognition), but to higher order levels of processing where the “schema” itself is modified.
Information as Entity
Brookes developed his “fundamental equation of information science”:
which defines that an existing state of knowledge, (S), is affected by some increment of information,
, resulting in a new
state of knowledge
(Brookes 1972). The underlying assumptions of Brookes is that information “must” modify
knowledge structure, and
“…that the growth of knowledge is not simply accretive. The absorption of information into a knowledge
structure may cause not simply an addition but some adjustment to the structure…” (Brookes 1972)
Liang proposes a theoretical model of information and information processing that articulates four basic entities: data,
information, knowledge, and wisdom (Liang 1994). Liang views the entities as a set of objects and constructs transformations
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from one entity to the next (information processing). While it is unusual in that it acknowledges the relationships between the
entities, it is problematic in its calculus for common usage.

Problems in Information Theory
Some fundamental problems remain unsolved. For example, the choice of information unit depends on the observer’s point
of view. If a message taken as a combination of signs forms the object of investigation, the sign is the ultimate carrier of
information. But if, on the other hand, the information source that produces signs is analyzed, information consists in the
selection of a sign from a pool of signs.
Another problem deals with un-addressed information. For example, on a very windy day a man is walking through a street.
Chance has it that a tile falls from a roof directly towards the man’s head. If the man notices the tile he will be taken by surprise;
he will be informed neither through binary selection, nor through a sign, but only through the situation of the tile falling towards
him. The existences of such “un-addressed” information is well known, but except for some tentative efforts (Nauta 1970), this
kind of information is generally neglected.
A further point to be debated is the persistence of information. For example does information lose its value after it has been
interpreted? Bar-Hillel says that the sentence “Jonny is hungry” contains no information for someone who already knows that
Jonny is hungry (Bar-Hillel 1964). Information would therefore merely influence the cognition process, in the sense of a
reduction of uncertainty, and would be limited in its effect to the reduction of a relative difference in knowledge between two
individuals.
However, it has to be pointed out that there are instances of persistent information. One example is provided by genetic
information. It is permanently stored and available for use in the genes and allows the cells that contain it to reproduce speciesspecific cells in the organism. The argument that this is a completely different kind of information can be countered by referring
to the fact that before the beginning of cell formation there is also an “information deficit” which is balanced when genetic
information is duplicated during mitosis. The result is two new cells with exactly the same genetic information as in the mother
cell, if we leave aside the occurrence of spontaneous mutations. Were one to apply this principle to mental processes, knowledge
would be persistently stored information, which could be transmitted as needed by means of information processes. Information
would then be a super-ordinate concept for knowledge and not just a tool of cognition.
Finally another problem has to be addressed. Most information theorists postulate that “truth” is a necessary requirement
of information. (Dretske 1981) can represent this view: “Information is what is capable of yielding knowledge, and since
knowledge requires truth, information requires it also.” But how do we interpret the situation when individuals unconsciously
base their “knowledge” on false premises and start to “inform” people around them with that “knowledge?” Don’t the same rules
apply to transmission, reception and storage as when they inform their neighbors on the basis of factually correct knowledge?
To answer this question in the affirmative leads to the inevitable conclusion that truth, however desirable it may be, is not a
necessary requirement of information. Thus deliberate misinformation could be accommodated in the same theory, which would
be in the interest of a broad-based information theory.

Conclusion
As indicated earlier, there has been considerable effort given toward paradigmatic development with respect to information.
Problems are still unresolved that shape the nature of how we can demarcate the topography of data, information, and knowledge.
A significant undertaking now is to reorient the emphasis of some MIS researchers. More MIS research should venture into
the construction of a paradigm for information if the discipline is to be elevated.

References
Reference available upon request from author (tbabbitt@pitt.edu).

-814-

